There has been quite a debate about Reformed views about human free will in the recent journal literature, particularly in this journal. In one respect, this is not a new development. Calvin's theology-which was influential and formative for much of the Reformed tradition even if it was not the only important source for later Reformed theology-was symptomatic of the tensions on this topic that later Reformed theologians continued to wrestle with. John Leith in his fine overview of the Reformed tradition speaks of Calvin's "unresolved dilemmas," even of his "contradictions," in his account of human free will in the following way: "A good illustration of the unresolved dilemmas in his theology is Calvin's insistence on the bondage of the human will and the freedom of the human will. Even when all the problems of terminology have been cleared up and when all qualifications have been noted, the tension between the inevitability of sin and human freedom and responsibility remain."1 However, it would be wrong to lay at Calvin's door all the problems the Reformed have had explaining human freedom in the light of human bondage to sin and the need of salvation in Christ. These are ancient concerns and much of the shape of Reformed thinking on these matters can be traced back to the ruminations of St. Augustine of Hippo, who is often said to be the fons et origo of the fixation with questions about human free will that persists in theological and philosophical literatures to the present day.2
There has been quite a debate about Reformed views about human free will in the recent journal literature, particularly in this journal. In one respect, this is not a new development. Calvin's theology-which was influential and formative for much of the Reformed tradition even if it was not the only important source for later Reformed theology-was symptomatic of the tensions on this topic that later Reformed theologians continued to wrestle with. John Leith in his fine overview of the Reformed tradition speaks of Calvin's "unresolved dilemmas," even of his "contradictions," in his account of human free will in the following way: "A good illustration of the unresolved dilemmas in his theology is Calvin's insistence on the bondage of the human will and the freedom of the human will. Even when all the problems of terminology have been cleared up and when all qualifications have been noted, the tension between the inevitability of sin and human freedom and responsibility remain."1 However, it would be wrong to lay at Calvin's door all the problems the Reformed have had explaining human freedom in the light of human bondage to sin and the need of salvation in Christ. These are ancient concerns and much of the shape of Reformed thinking on these matters can be traced back to the ruminations of St. Augustine of Hippo, who is often said to be the fons et origo of the fixation with questions about human free will that persists in theological and philosophical literatures to the present day. Nevertheless, although there is a context and history of debate about these matters which is ongoing, there are also certain fixed points along the way that help navigate the difficult waters of discussion about human freedom. This is true in the philosophical context, of course. It is also true in the historic theological literature, which is the main concern of the symposium for which these remarks are the introduction. St Augustine may be the person whose work shaped the debate that has ensued in the last one and a half thousand years more than any other. But others have had a significant impact on how the issues have been framed and discussed, as well as the shape of substantive arguments for one view or another. In the medieval church this was true of St Anselm of Canterbury; it was also true of St Thomas Aquinas, of Duns Scotus, William Ockham, and others. In the Reformation churches the issue of human freedom did not disappear. One of the most celebrated fixed points in the history of discussion about human free will in Christian theology was the heated exchange between Erasmus and Martin Luther on this matter.
Another such fixed point is the contribution made by the Reformed churches, doctors, and their confessions. The popular understanding of this-which is, in many respects, the received understanding from scholarship of previous generations-is that the Reformed adopted a way of thinking about human freedom and human bondage that was consistent with God's ordination of all things, even the tiniest details of human life. Providence, according to the Reformed, is meticulous. God oversees all that obtains in this world, either decreeing it, or somehow permitting its occurrence in such a way that there is no leeway for something other to prevail than what God allows to come to pass. Yet, say the Reformed, humans-even fallen humans-are still free. They still possess free will, and they are still morally responsible for the free actions they commit or refrain from committing, though their wills are in bondage to sin. This, in a nutshell is the Reformed dilemma of which Leith speaks in connection with Calvin's work.
How to resolve this dilemma has been a longstanding theological problem. It is, in some ways, a variant upon the freedom-foreknowledge dilemma. This can be expressed as follows. Suppose God has complete knowledge of all future contingents, including the contingent future actions of human creatures. And suppose this knowledge is "fixed. 
